NYLS Law Review
Volume 1
Issue 1 NEW YORK LAW FORUM, vol 1, 1955

Article 36

January 1955

LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF CHOICE OF BARGAINING
REPRESENTATIVE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT BAR DOCTRINE
UNDER THE NLRA
BENJAMIN B. NAUMOFF

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
BENJAMIN B. NAUMOFF, LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF CHOICE OF BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT BAR DOCTRINE UNDER THE NLRA, 1 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (1955).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF CHOICE OF
BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT BAR DOCTRINE UNDER THE NLRA
BENJAMIN B. NAUMOFF

1. INTRODUCTION
THE passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935,1 com-

monly referred to as the Wagner Act, had as one of its purposes, the
intent to provide a medium for employees in businesses affecting
commerce within the meaning of the Act, to freely express their choice
for a bargaining representative. At the same time, one of the stated
purposes of the Act, and oft repeated since, is the encouragement it
gives to avoidance of industrial conflict by providing a means for not
only the establishment of collective bargaining but the impetus to
create stability in the bargaining relationship, once begun.
While it is true that the election process, in the form of the representation proceeding under the aegis of the National Labor Relations Board, gave and is still giving to countless thousands of individuals in the country an opportunity to exercise the franchise, heretofore not experienced and hence, a lesson in the meaning of a vote,
it is also to be borne in mind that this was a statutory privilege, not
a constitutional right. For the Board, by statutory grant, was given
the authority in the exercise of its expertise to implement the privilege and at the same time to adopt certain rules, regulations and declarations of administrative policy which would take into account and
give serious consideration to tradition and practice in the organization and operation of industry; the organization of employees into
labor organizations; the community of interest in employee relationships; the history and scope of collective bargaining in an industry.
The amendments to the NLRA in 1947, commonly referred to as the
Taft-Hartley Act, did not essentially change the posture or the authority of the Board in this respect.3
There is thus posed for the Board a difficulty in drawing a balBaixjAm

B. NAUamOFF is Chief Field Examiner, National Labor Relations Board,

Second Region.
1 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1952).

2 Pub. L. No. 101, 8oth Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1947).
3 National Labor Relations Act § 9(c), 49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended 61 STAT.
136 (1947), 21 U. S. C. § 151 (1952).
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ance line between two conflicting concepts embodied in the Act-the
encouragement of collective bargaining with a view to the establishment of stability in bargaining relationships and the freedom of employees to select a bargaining representative of their own choosing.
To square what appeared to be irreconcilable concepts, the Board
adopted what has come to be known as its "contract bar doctrine".
Simply put, the doctrine is that a collective bargaining agreement
between an employer and a labor organization may preclude or bar
a determination of representatives, upon petition of another labor organization or individual, for a reasonable period. Stated in terms of
the reverse side of the coin, employees are entitled to change or dispose of their collective bargaining representative, if they so desire,
at reasonable intervals.
The apparent simplicity of the doctrine is somewhat deceptive
as will be seen from the mass of decisional policy which has been
created with the passage of time. It is obvious that the doctrine, so
vital a part of our labor relations problems, could not, in the nature
of things, remain static. Our industrial society is constantly undergoing change-businesses may be centralized or decentralized-plants
may be contracted or expanded-relationships between the employer
and the collective bargaining agent may in some aspects of our industrial economy produce a cooperative effort to eliminate chaotic
tendencies, which requires time-growth of industry or unionization
may have its impact upon the freedom or opportunity of employees
to vary or change a bargaining relationship.
What is dealt with here is the application of the doctrine where
the status of an established bargaining representative is challenged
upon the petition of a rival labor organization or individual in which
the claim is made that a question concerning representation exists
among employees in an appropriate unit.
II.

INITIAL APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE UNDER THE
WAGNER ACT
THE application of the contract bar doctrine, while nearly as old
as the Act itself, had its origins, not with the Board, but rather as a
result of contentions made by the parties to the collective bargaining
agreement. For examnple, in the first case in which the contract bar
issue was decided,4 the contention was raised that statements of wage
4 New England Transportation Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 430 (1936).
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rates and working conditions, prepared by the company and signed
by some but not all the employees with benefits going only to those
who signed, constituted valid contracts. The Board directed an election on the theory that the documents did not constitute a bar to an
eleition but refused specifically to pass upon their validity. Shortly
5 a contract
thereafter, in Black Diamond Steamship Corporation,
was
held not to be a bar to a rival petition, where it was entered into with
knowledge that the rival union was also claiming majority status.
These early cases, and those which followed during the period
from 1936 to 1939, may be characterized as non-declaratory decisional doctrine; that is to say that in none of them was there a declaration by the Board as to what, in its opinion, would constitute a valid
contract bar. This is understandable in view of the situation then existing in our labor relations. The constitutionality of the Act was
being tested in the courts, and it was not judicially approved by the
United States Supreme Court until 1937. Moreover, while there is no
necessity to belabor the point in the context of this discussion, the
Board was confronted with the problem of evaluating agreements
which on their face purported to be genuine collective bargaining
agreements but which, in fact, were unilaterally prepared and enforced by the employer or were made with "labor organizations"
which were the creatures of the employer or which did not in fact
represent an uncoerced majority of the employees. Similarly, documents were presented to the Board as defenses to a petition which
were either individual contracts of hire or mere declarations of company policy, not subject to negotiation. These were struck down
but in none of the cases was there a positive declaration by the Board
to serve as a guidepost for future policy." Notwithstanding the negative approach as indicated above, the decisions are historic. They
form by clear inference an important part of the Board's contract bar
doctrine and are still largely adhered to.
5 2 N. L. R. B. 241 (1936).
8 Federal Knitting Mills, 3 N. L. R. B. 257 (1937), contract not a bar where
contracting union, in prior unfair labor practice case found to have been illegally
united; American-West African Line, Inc., 4 N. L. R. B. 1086 (1938), contract no
bar where executed while representation petition pending before the Board; contract
not a bar where it had been in existence for some time, one year already having expired, Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios, 7 N. L. R. B. 662 (1938); or where orally

extended, SEISS Mfg. Co., 7 N. L. R. B. 481 (1938); contract with a union for its
members only not a bar, Northrup Corp., 3 N. L. R. B. 228 (1937); Sound Timber
Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 844 (1938), contract not a bar where union has ceased to function.
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While it is true that in early 1938, the Board made its first finding of contract bar, Superior Electrical Products Co.,' that decision
and others subsequent to it in which it was cited, indicate that the
Board was deciding the issue not in terms of the agreement but of
the conduct of the employees prior to its execution and that unit considerations played a part as well.
In 1939, the Board enunciated its first positive contract bar
rules. In National Sugar Refining Co.,8 it held that a one year contract was not of unreasonable duration and hence not contrary to the
policies of the Act. Here, the Board had to balance the conflicting
equities in national labor policy previously referred to, namely, that
of permitting the exercise of choice of a bargaining representative as
against that of maintenance of stability in labor relations for a reasonable period of time. The step was significant, though somewhat cautious. Its acceptance was to give to the Board, in some degree at
least, public approval of its use of discretion and expertness in creating a framework for duration of collective bargaining arrangements.
The "one year rule" was not static as was amply demonstrated
two years later. The Board realized that it should not impose an
arbitrary rule on segments of industry which had already developed
maturity in labor relations. Hence, in Owens-Illinois Pacific Coast
Co.,9 it said that it would hold contracts for a two year term to be
a bar if they were customary in or typical of the industry involved.
This was done in the face of a showing that a considerable number
of the employees involved actually desired the petitioner to represent
them. The problem was more than academic. Its determination was
to have an impact upon good faith bargaining with a union which
represented a majority when the agreement was signed. Moreover,
it was designed to encourage and maintain stability in labor relations
at a time when the nation was facing one of, if not the greatest
perils in its history. Finally, that stability was being enhanced by
maturity and the realization that legitimate, uncoerced bargaining
was taking place to a larger degree than at any time since the passage of the Act.
As offshoots, however, it should be noted that the Board kept
7 6 N. L. R. B. 19 (1938).
8 i0 N. L. R. B. 1410 (1939).
9 36 N. L. R. B. 990 (1941).
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a watchful eye on custom in the industry, as it demonstrated in Uxbridge Worsted Company, Inc., 0 where it held that it would consider
evidence that a two year contract ran counter to the well-established
custom in the industry, and in A. S. Abell Company," where a three
year contract was held not to be a bar after one year in the absence of
proof that such contracts were the custom in the industry. By the
same token, the Board, taking into consideration the fact that the
first transitional period in collective bargaining under the control of
the Act was passing and that stability for a longer period did not
unreasonably encroach on freedom of choice, held in one of its last decisions under the Wagner Act that contracts for a two year period
constituted a bar to a rival petition.' This principle is still followed
by the Board.
III.

CURRENT CONTRACT BAR POLICY OF THE BOARD
COLLECTIVE bargaining relationships, once established, may be and
often are subject to changes in our industrial society, internal policies of management and labor, technological advances, outside influence or peril. In this framework of our economy, the Board was confronted with and had to adapt itself to these changes and was required to create a body of decisional doctrine on contracts, having not
only to do with duration of the agreement but its renewal; the ability
of the incumbent union to adequately represent the employees; the
impact of disaffection or schism within the contract holding union;
plant merger, absorption, expansion or contraction; opening of new
units, etc. The Board, in the exercise of its authority under the statute, established administrative policy or doctrine. The policy was not,
in the nature of things, tied to common law concepts of contract law,
nor was it ever intended that it should be. The policy in its several
aspects will be dealt with below, but suffice it to say, for the moment,
that it has essentially stood the test of time and experience, notwithstanding the changes and developments in our industrial society and
the fact that it deals with so volatile a field as labor relations.
We turn now to the contract bar doctrine as currently interpreted
by the Board. To begin with the validity of a collective bargaining
agreement in a representation case is presumed.' The presumption is
10 60 N. L. R. B. 1395 (1945).
1 62 N. L. R. B. 1414 (1945).
12 Reed Roller Bit Co., 72 N. L. R. B. 927 (1947).
13 Electro Metallurgical Co., 72 N. L. R. B. 1396 (1947).
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of course rebuttable, by direct evidence of illegality in the agreement
itself. Certain general rules'have evolved over the years which the
Board has adopted as policy in holding that contracts are not a bar
to a representation petition. These may be listed as follows:
(1) An oral agreement. 4
(2) The term of the contract was unreasonable, that is, more than
two years in a normal situation. 15
(3) There are no substantive provisions in the contract fixing
terms and conditions of employment and the contract is a recognition agreement only.'
17
(4) The contract was executed after the filing of a valid petition.
(5) The contract was one for members only and did not provide
for exclusive8 representation of all the employees in an appropriate unit.'
(6) The contracting union had ceased to function or schism had
developed within it.'9
(7) The contract contained an illegal union security clause, namely,
one which by its language exceeded the permissive limits of
Section 8(a) (3) of the Act,20 and,

(8) The contract covered an inappropriate unit in contravention
of a prior Board determination or Board policy.21
Similarly, collective bargaining agreements executed under the
following circumstances do constitute a bar to a petition and no question concerning representation exists:
(1) A recognition agreement or informal document which incorporates by reference a complete agreement covering substantive
terms and conditions. 2
(2) An otherwise valid agreement where no provision exists in the
14 Eicor, Inc., 46 N. L. R. B. 1035 (1943).
15 See note 12 sipra.
16 Duplex Printing Press Co., 53 N. L. R. B. 503 (1943); cf. Nash-Kelvinator
Corp., 110 N. L. R. B. 447 (1954).

17 Fifth Avenue Shoe Corp., 69 N. L. R. B. 400 (1946).

18 Crucible Steel Castings Co., 90 N. L. R. B. 1843 (1950); Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 111 N. L. R. B. 1210 (1955).
19 Olive and Myers Mfg. Co., 29 N. L. R. B. 650 (1940); Fruehauf Trailer Co.,
85 N. L. R. B. 1509 (1949).
20 C. Hager and Sons Hinge Mfg. Co., 80 N. L. R. B. 163 (1948).
21 Continental Can Co., 91 N. L. R. B. 500 (1950); Wilford Auto Sales, Inc.,
106 N. L. R. B. 1396 (1953); cf. American Dye Wood Co., 99 N. L. R. B. 78 (1952),
in which the Board held that the inclusion of guards comprising only a small segment
of the overall unit did not leave the contract open to attack with respect to the production and maintenance unit, and National Kelvinator Corp., 107 N. L. R. B. 644
(1953), where the Board held such a contract not a bar on a petition for a unit consigned to guards only.
22 Phelps-Dodge Corp., 93 N. L. R. B. 990 (1951); Spartan Aircraft Co., 98
N. L. R. B. 73 (1952).
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contract requiring ratification by the employees or the signature of a union official prior to its effectiveness.2"
(3) An agreement which recognizes the union so long as it conbe designated as the bargaining agent for the emtinues to
24
ployees.
(4) Where the contracting union has committed itself during the
term of the contract to refrain from organizing or representing
employees not covered in the agreement.25
At the same time, the collective bargaining relationship once
established may be entitled to additional protection or inhibited under
statutory or administrative authority of the Board. In this connection, the Board has been confronted with the following problems:
(a) Establishing a cutoff date for the timely filing of rival representation petitions.
(b) Dealing with the significance of an automatic renewal provision in a contract.
(c) The effect to be given to premature extensions or renewals of
agreements regardless of modification.
(d) The impact of Section 8(d) of the Act as amended.
(e) The extent to which a Board certification should be implemented.
(f) The problem of internal dissension within the contracting
union leading either to schism, expulsion, defunction or mere
change in designation.
(g) The impact that maturity and stability in labor relations has
upon the reasonableness of the duration of the contract.
(h) The validity of the agreement dependent upon the validity of
its union security provision under Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
(i) Conduct of the contracting union as constituting a breach of
contract.
(j) Merger, absorption, expansion or change in ownership of the
contracting employer, and,
(k) Employer's bargaining history on a single or multi-employer
unit basis.
These are dealt with below.
A. TImELINESS OF PETITION IN RELATION TO CONTRACT.The Board found it necessary in order to encourage parties to collec23 Lewittes and Sons, 96 N. L. R. B. 175 (1951); Filtration Engineers, Inc., 98
N. L. R. B. 1210 (1952); American Broadcasting Co., 114 N. L. R. B. No. 2 (1955).
24 General Electric Co., 99 N. L. R. B. 956 (1952).
25 Briggs Indiana Corp., 63 N. L. R. B. 1270 (1945); cf. Standard Lime and

Stone Co., 74 N. L. R. B. 893 (1947), in which the Board held that mere exclusion

of employees from the coverage clause of the contract is not tantamount to a commitment not to represent such employees and hence the contract does not operate
as a bar.
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tive bargaining agreements to negotiate renewals or modification of
their agreement, to place some time limitation upon the rival organization's being able to raise a question concerning representation. Accordingly, it held that the bare assertion of a claim by a rival union
which is not followed up by a filing of the petition within 10 days
thereafter will not invalidate a contract signed in the interim period,
if the agreement was one which was not prematurely extended or renewed. The claim by the rival need not be a majority claim. 20 Situa-

tions occur where agreements are signed at or about the time that a
claim is made and a petition filed immediately thereafter. In these
circumstances the Board has held that a contract is not a bar where
a petition is filed before the execution of the contract notwithstanding the fact that the notice of filing is received by the Company after
its execution.

27

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF AUTOMATIC RENEWAL PRovisioNs.-The
prevalence of automatic renewal provisions in agreements required the
Board to establish a timeliness rule with respect to rival union petitions. A number of cases have established what has come to be known
as offshoots of the Board's Mill-B Doctrine. In its first case dealing
with the problem, the Board held that a contract which was automatically renewed prior to the filing of the petition constituted a
bar.28 Moreover the petition or claim had to be filed or made before
the Mill-B or automatic renewal date to be effective.29 In this connection, if the parties to an agreement did not give timely written
notice in accordance with the contract modification or termination
clause, the contract is automatically renewed even though the parties
appointed negotiating committees prior to the Mill-B date and negotiated substantive contract changes during and after the Mill-B period." Some policy also had to be established which would indicate
when a rival petition could be filed in the light of the Mill-B doctrine
26 General Electric X-Ray Corp., 67 N. L. R. B. 997 (1946); Henry and Allen,
Inc., 68 N. L. R. B. 724 (1946); Associated Food Distributors, 109 N. L. R. B. 874
(1954).
27 White Acre Greer Fireproofing Co., 100 N. L. R. B. 1107 (1952); cf. Northwest Magnesite Co., 101 N. L. R. B. 85 (1952), in which a petition was dismissed
where it was filed the same day as the execution of the contract and the employer
had no knowledge of its filing. See also, Royal Dalton, Ltd., 112 N. L. R. B. No. 100
(1955), in which a contract was held to be a bar where it was executed one day
after receipt of notice from petitioner, of demand for permission to carry on organizational work but no demand for recognition or for contract.
28 Mill B., Inc., 40 N. L. R. B. 346 (1942).
29 Miles Laboratories, Inc., 92 N. L. R. B. 23 (1950).
80 Phelps-Dodge Refining Corp., 112 N. L. R. B. No. 150 (195).
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and the Board has determined that a contract is not a bar to a peti31
tion filed three months prior to the automatic renewal date.
Moreover, the practicalities of labor relations disclose that rival
unions engage in organizational efforts many months prior to the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. The parties to the
agreement nonetheless desire that the stability once created be maintained. Hence, the Board has established additional rules with respect
to extensions of contracts which do not fall within the premature extension doctrine as discussed later on. For example, if the parties
execute an extension subsequent to the automatic renewal date but
prior to the filing of a petition, the extension constitutes a bar regardless of when it becomes effective. 32 Similarly, an extension executed
prior to the automatic renewal date and made immediately effective,
bars a petition filed after the automatic renewal date.

3

It thus be-

comes important to determine the conduct of the parties and whether
or not their intention is to modify the agreement and to effect an
automatic renewal. If the modification notice indicates no desire to
34
re-open the agreement, the contract may be automatically renewed.
By the same token an incumbent union is estopped from urging an
automatic renewal of a contract as a bar where notwithstanding the
fact that it served late notice of modification, it took no steps to dissipate the clear impression that it was attempting to forestall a renewal, until after the rival petition was filed. 35
C. IMPACT oF NOTICE REQUiEMENTS UNDER NLRA § 8(d).
-The amendments to the Act in 1947 posed an additional problem
for the Board in connection with its Mill-B Doctrine.3" The Board
has held in construing legislative intent that Section 8(d) of the Act
must be read into each contract where notice of modification has been
given and that a new contract executed pursuant to a 60 day notice
under Section 8(d), in the 60 day period prior to expiration, will bar
a petition filed after execution regardless of whether there is a Mill-B
date of lesser duration or no Mill-B date at all.37 Section 8(d), how31 DeSoto Creamery and Products Co., 94 N. L. R. B. 1627 (1951).
32 Northwestern Publishing Co., 71 N. L. R. B. 167 (1946); Mississippi Lime
Co., 71 N. L. R. B. 472 (1946).
33 Greenville Furnishing Co., 71 N. L. R. B. 436 (1946).
34 Eagle Signal Corp., 111 N. L. R. B. 1006 (1955).

35 Diamond Printing Co., 109 N. L. R. B. 20 (1954).
36 National Labor Relations Act § 8(4), 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158.
37 DeSoto Creamery and Products Co., 94 N. L. R. B. 1627 (1951); Robertson Bros. Dept. Store, Inc., 97 N. L. R. B. 258 (1951).
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ever, does not create an automatic renewal of the contract. If no
notice is given, the contract is not a bar to a petition filed prior to
the Mill-B or automatic renewal date. 8
D. PREMATURE EXTENSION OR RENEWAL OF CONTRACTS.--The
discussion above has been limited to situations where when the parties
to a collective bargaining agreement negotiate extensions or changes
in or ab6ut the period where an automatic renewal is possible. There
are, however, instances where parties to an agreement, regardless of
modification or extension, renew their agreements long before the
period established in the contract. The Board was thus confronted
with the problem of establishing a policy dealing with what has come
to be known as premature extensions. In this situation, the conflicting equities of stability in labor relations as against the freedom of
choice of representation is brought into focus. The Board's general
doctrine is that if an agreement is extended during the term of the
existing contract, the contract is vulnerable to a rival petition but
only near the end of the initial reasonable period of the contract, normally two years.3" The premature extension doctrine will not be applied, however, where the parties negotiate a new agreement following
one of reasonable duration or which contained an illegal union security clause where the initial agreement was terminated by the parties
after two years and a new contract signed immediately for a two
year period, all of which occurred prior to the filing of the petition.40
Nor can the parties by supplemental agreement preclude a rival petition by moving the terminal date of the contract forward. The petitioner is entitled to rely on the Mill-B date of the original agreement.4 1
Furthermore, the problem of mid-term modifications or negotiations must be dealt with by the Board. The Board has indicated that
where parties negotiate in mid-term and effect changes in the agreement, the contract is still a bar notwithstanding the fact that the
changes made go beyond the scope of the modification clause so long
as the term of the contract is not extended. 2 Recently, however, this
doctrine has been modified, with the Board holding that where a
modification clause is unlimited in scope and where, during mid-term
38 International Harvester Co., 77 N. L. R. B. 242 (1948).
39 Republic Steel Corp., 84 N. L. R. B. 483 (1949).
40 Cushman's Sons, Inc., 88 N. L. R. B. 121 (1950).
41 Westinghouse Electric Corp., 102 N. L. R. B. 270-275 (1953).
42 Western Electric Co., 94 N. L. R. B. 54 (1951).
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filing agreement, the union can strike and the employer can terminate
the strike, instability is thus created and the contract is open to attack so long as the petition is timely filed with respect to the time
3
for giving notice under the termination or modification clause.1 It
should be noted, however, that the contract must enable either party
44
to terminate, otherwise the contract is a bar.
E. EFFECT OF CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE.- Two further additional amendments to the Act in 1947 relating to the implementation of a certification of representatives issued by the Board
provides another area in which the Board must establish policy in
dealing with an appropriate time in which a question concerning representation can be raised. Section 9(c)(3) of the Act provides in
part that "no election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any
subdivision within which in the preceding 12 month period a valid
election shall have been held." Section 8(b) (4) (C) provides in part
that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to
engage in certain conduct, an object of which is 'forcing or requiring
any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as a representative of his employees if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees, under
the provision of Section 9.'" In application of Board policy implementing a certification, the Board originally held that the contracting
parties were free during a period of one year from the date of the
certification to execute one or as many agreements as they desired.45
This was later broadened to require a dismissal of a petition filed at
any time during the certification year.4" However, recently the Board
has modified this doctrine and now holds that a certification is ineffectual against a petition timely filed with respect to a contract executed during the certification year, e.g., if the contract expires or is
subject to renewal during the year, the parties can no longer execute
more than one contract during the certification year in the face of a
timely rival petition.4 7
F.

SCHISM IN

OR DEFUNCTNESS

OF CONTRACTING UNION.-

Another circumstance which has occupied the Board's attention in the
43 General Electric Co., 108 N. L. R. B. 1290 (1954).
44 Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 112 N. L. R. B. No. 170 (1955); Mallinckrodt
Chemical Works, 114 N. L. R. B. No. 48 (1955).
45 Quaker Maid Co., 71 N. L. R. B. 915 (1946).
40 Centr-O-Cast Engineering Co., 100 N. L. R. B. 1507 (1952).
47 Ludlow Typograph Co., 108 N. L. R.. B. 1463 (1954).
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realm of contract bar doctrine is one in which internal dissension
takes place within the contracting union during the life of the contract
and leads to either schism in or defunctness of the contracting union.
If the contracting union becomes defunct, that is, incapable of or unwilling to service the employees involved, its contract is not a bar to
a petition filed by a rival union. 4' The difficulty in most instances
arising in this situation is that of determining whether or not an actual
schism has taken place. If the evidence suffices to show that through
collective and formalized effort a union has disaffiliated from its
parent and either established itself as an independent labor organization or affiliated with another international union, the contract is not
a bar. 49 The action, however, must be taken within the framework
of the disaffiliating union's by-laws and not at a meeting called by a
rival union.50 The facts must also indicate that there is a complete
breakdown in the bargaining relationship, not merely that a constitutional quorum has voted to disaffiliate and, furthermore, the disaffiliation action must be as broad in scope as in the unit covered by
the contract asserted as a bar. 1 There is, however, in the schism doctrine, one exception. The Board has held that schism is established
when it appears that the disaffiliation action is directly related to the
expulsion of the union from its parent and the expulsion is the major
factor in such action. The Board discounts the fact that the employees received aid in such action from the petitioning union.52
G. MERE CHANGE IN AFFILIATION OF CONTRACTING UNION.Change in designation of a local union may also occur in circumstances not related to internal dissension or schism. For example, one
labor organization may affiliate with another with the result that the
contracting union is to all intents and purposes defunct. However,
where the facts disclose that such affiliation was taken at meetings
of the incumbent union and the membership voted overwhelmingly
to affiliate with the new organization; the Board holds that this is
a change in affiliation under which the petitioner becomes in effect the
collective bargaining agent and as such continues to be bound by the
terms of the existing contract for the remainder of its term. Under
48 Schaefer Body, Inc., 85 N. L. R. B. 105 (1949).
49 Fruehauf Trailer Co., 85 N. L. R. B. 1509 (1949).

50 Boyle-Midway, Inc., 97 N. L. R. B. 895 (1951).
51 Saginaw Furniture Shops, 97 N. L. R. B. 1488 (1952); Harris Products Co., 96

N. L. R. B. 812 (1951).
52 New Jersey Zinc Co., 108 N. L. R. B. 230 (1954).
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these circumstances, the employer is under no duty to bargain with
the petitioning union concerning a new contract since no question concerning representation exists.5" Under similar circumstances where
there has been an assignment of a contract by a local union to which
its international was not a signatory, to a newly formed successor
labor organization or to another labor union the continuing identity
of the contracting bargaining representative is not destroyed. The
mere change of affiliation does not disturb the identity of the bargaining agent and a rival union petition under these circumstances will
be dismissed.5 4
H. LENGTH OF TIME OF NEw CONTRACT.-In the discussion
of early cases arising before the Board on the reasonableness of the
term of the contract, it was noted that after adhering to the one year
rule early in its history, the Board adopted a rule that contracts for
a two year period, if otherwise valid, constitute a bar. As our labor
relations evolved and more stability was created the trend towards
contracts of longer duration became evident and the Board accommodated itself to the industrial facts of life. Hence, it first adopted the
rule that contracts for a period in excess of two years would constitute a bar, if customary in the industry, and more recently has held
that if a substantial part of an industry is covered by contracts in
excess of two years, regardless of the custom, such contracts constitute a bar for their full period." If substantiality can not be shown,
contracts for a term in excess of two years or for an indefinite term
or which are terminable at will, constitute a bar for two years. 56
I. UNION SECURITY PROwsION AFFECTING VALIDITY OF CONTRACT.-The presence of a clause in a contract dealing with some
form of union security raises important problems in dealing with the
Board's contract bar doctrine. The Act provides in substance that an
employer is not precluded from making an agreement with a labor
organization which requires as a condition of employment membership
in such organization on or after 30 days following the execution date
53 Charles Beck Machine Corp., 107 N. L. R. B. 674 (1954); cf. Ludlow Typograph Co., 113 N. L. R. B. 77, in which the employer was required to bargain when
the Board held prior contract was not a bar to petition.
54 Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 106 N. L. R. B. 237 (1953); R. C. Williams & Co., Inc., 107 N. L. R. B. 933 (1954).
55 General Motors Corp., 102 N. L. R. B. 1739-40 (1953); Republic Aviation
Corp., 109 N. L. R. B. 569 (1954).
56 Filtrol Corp., 91 N. L. R. B. 921 (1950); Rohm & Haas Co., 108 N. L. R. B.

1285 (1954).
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of the agreement or the commencement of employment, whichever
occurs later, providing further that the. labor organization has received a certificate of compliance from the Board under Sections
9(f), (g), and (h) of the Act within the preceding 12 month period.57
Early in its interpretation of this provision of the Act, the Board held
that the mere existence of a union shop clause in a contract which was
executed or renewed after the execution date of the Taft-Hartley Act
and which exceeded the permissive limits of Section 8(a) (3), rendered the contract not a bar."8 The provision, however, must be a
condition of employment rather than merely an agreement among
employees to remain members of the union. 9 The contract must accord present employees not already members the 30 day grace period
as provided in the statute.8 0 However, employees already members of
the union either voluntarily or pursuant to a prior valid contract are
not entitled to an additional grace period."' It will readily be seen
that additional problems of statutory construction were involved when
the contracting parties attempted to provide for deferral of an illegal
union security provision, which postponed its effective date or attempted to cure the defect by placing in the contract a separability
clause. On the subject of deferral, the Board has held that if the parties clearly indicate that the illegal union security provision is not
to take effect until compliance with the law or until sanction through
the Board's procedures, the contract is a valid one.62 The deferral,
however, must be clear. Where a contract indicates merely that the
illegal provision is subject to applicable provisions, restrictions and
conditions of the Act or if its provisions conflict with federal or state
law, the legal provisions shall apply; this is not considered a clear
deferral and the contract is not a bar.13 The existence of a separability clause in the contract does not cure the effect of an illegal union
security clause and the contract is not a bar.64 In this connection,
57 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 49 STAT. 449 (1935),

§ 151.

29 U. S. C.

58 C. Hager & Sons Hinge Mfg. Co., 80 N. L. R. B. 63 (1948).
59 Hercules Powder Co., Inc., 90 N. L. R. B. 607 (1950).
60 American Coating Mills, 97 N. L. R. B. 638 (1951).
61 Charles A. Kraus Milling Co., 97 N. L. R. B. 536 (1951), overruling the Hager
case to this extent.
62 Wyckoff Steel Co., 86 N. L. R. B. 1318 (1949); Allen v. Smith, Tnc., 96
N. L. R. B. 230 (1951).
63 Maiden Form Brassiere Co., Inc., 96 N. L. R. B. 678 (1951); National Malleable and Steel Castings Co., 99 N. L. R. B. 737 (1952).

64 Unique Art Mfg. Co., 83 N. L. R. B. 1250 (1949).
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however, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the Rockaway News Supply Company case65 posed problems for the
Board in connection with its policy on evidence in union security
clause cases in representation proceedings. The Supreme Court in
that case held that the Board in an unfair labor practice case had no
sanction in law to disregard a separability clause in a contract. This
decision was subsequent to the Board's determination in the Unique
Art Manufacturing case referred to above. Following the decision of
the Supreme Court, the Board as a matter of policy proceeded to take
evidence in representation cases, where an extension of a collective
bargaining agreement was involved, as to whether all employees of
the employer were members of the union on the date of the renewal
or extension of the agreement and overruled prior cases which were
inconsistent therewith.66 This was the forerunner of a number of
cases decided since in which the Board has declared that the failure
in the contract to expressly provide the statutory grace period for employees who were not members of the incumbent union when the contract became effective, does not render the contract vulnerable to a
petition in the absence of evidence that any employee in that position
was required to become a member in violation of the Act or that any
discrimination was practiced against him under the contract. 67 Furthermore, the Board has also held that a contract provision which
provides for voluntary action on the part of the employee in signing
dues and initiation fee checkoffs, will not invalidate the contract, it
being necessary that evidence disclose that the employees were required to do this.6 Finally, it should be noted that where there has
been a break in continuity in the agreements or contracts, the subsequent agreement in order to operate as a bar must accord the statutory grace period to the employees.6 9 While the Taft-Hartley Act at
its inception provided for the holding of so-called union shop elections, subsequent amendment eliminated that requirement but substituted the necessity for a certificate of compliance with Section
9(f), (g) and (h) in order to validate a union shop provision."0 ComOr 345 U. S. 71, 73 S. Ct. 519, 97 L. Ed. 832 (1953).
66 Regal Shoe Corp., 106 N. L. R. B. 1078 (1953).
67 A. Sandler Co., 110 N. L. R. B. 738 (1954).
68 Milwaukee Gas and Light Co., 111 N. L. R. B. 837 (1955); Bazley & Junedale Meat Markets Co., 114 N. L. R. B. No. 20 (1955).
69 Seattle Bakers Bureau, Inc., 101 N. L. R. B. 1344 (1952).
70 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151
(1952), as amended, Pub. L. No. 189, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
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pliance with the filing requirements, namely, the furnishing of financial data to the Department of Labor and the non-communist affidavits to the Board is thus a prerequisite to validity of a union shop
provision in a contract. However, where the contracting union complies with Section 9(f), (g) and (h) before the rival petition is filed
or has appropriately indicated its intent to do so and accomplished
this prior to the disposition of the proceeding by the Board, the contract constitutes a bar notwithstanding the fact that it was executed
prior to compliance with the filing requirements of the Act. 1
J. IMPACT OF BREACH OF CONTRACT BY UNIoN.-The Board is
also confronted with the problem of the effect to be given to a contract where a breach of a no strike clause has occurred, notwithstanding the fact that a strike by employees under such a circumstance is
not protected by the act since it is in violation of a no strike provision. The contract nonetheless may constitute a bar to a rival petition in the absence of any clear evidence that the employer has
rescinded the contract because of the breach.72 However, if the employer terminates the agreement because of a breach the contract does
not constitute a bar regardless of the fact that he may later meet with
7
the incumbent union for bargaining purposes.

K.

CONTRACTS WHERE MERGER OR ABSORPTION OF EMPLOYEE

UNioN.-The issue of contract bar often arises when a change in
ownership of the business affected takes place or when there is a
merger or absorption occurring or when plant expansion or transfer
is effected. This problem is an ever recurring one as analysis of our
industrial society has shown. In this instance the Board must again
accommodate itself to the practices in our industrial society in the developments which take place within it. Hence, the Board holds that
where two companies merge and as a result of the merger, the employees are intermingled and there has also been an intermingling of
other operations of the merged companies, the merger of the two corporations is comparable to an entirely new operation. Accordingly,
a contract in existence between the second company and another
union is not a bar to a petition filed for the overall unit since only a
unit including the employees of both corporations is appropriate
71 Avco Mfg. Corp., 106 N. L. R. B. 645 (1951); Dichello, Inc., 107 N. L. R. B.
1642 (1954).

72 Land O'Sun Dairies, Inc., 107 N. L. R. B. 195 (1954).
73 Moore Drop Forge Co., 108 N. L. R. B. 32 (1954).
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under these circumstances. 4 In addition the Board will apply its
established contract rule where a new owner executes a new agreement with the incumbent union, the only change being in the termination date of the agreement, all other terms remaining the same,
and a rival union petition will be dismissed.75 In further application
of its theory that new ownership does not create any pre-existing contractual obligations, the Board has also held that where a new employer executes a memorandum of agreement continuing in force the
terms of the old contract by extending its term for a period of one
year, this is considered an initial contract between the parties. 6 Finally, in cases having to do with the problem of after-acquired plants or
transfers, the Board has held that in the normal situation a contract
which covers plants thereafter to be acquired, is not a bar to a rival
petition filed for employees at those plants in the absence of any history of collective bargaining for a reasonable period.7 7 In addition,
a contract covering a plant which has moved and where a minor proportion of employees as well as supervision has actually transferred,
8
is not a bar to a rival petition.7

L. EFFECT ON CONTRACT WHERE EMPLOYER JOINS OR LEAVES
MULTI-EMPLOYER

UNIT.-Finally, the Board's contract bar doctrine

comes into play in a situation which is most often considered in terms
of determination of appropriate unit but also involves the validity of
a collective bargaining agreement. Frequently an employer who has
had a history of bargaining on a single employer unit or no history
at all becomes a member of an association which engages in bargaining on behalf of several employers in the industry. In these circumstances, the Board early determined that a contract covering the company which joined an association but whose employees had not had
an opportunity to choose or reject the bargaining agent did not constitute a bar.79 The Board's more recent policy is that if an employer has been included by contract in a multi-employer unit for a
period in excess of one year, this is considered to be a sufficiently
74 L. B. Spear & Co., 106 N. L. R. B. 687 (1953).
75 Metropolitan Coach Lines, 112 N. L. R. B. No. 184 (1955).
70 Stubnitz Greene Spring Corp., 113 N. L. R. B. No. 28 (1955).

77 Sinclair Refining Co., 92 N. L. R. B. 643 (1950).
78 General Electric Co., 85 N. L. R. B. 1316 (1949); cf. Yale Rubber Mfg. Co.,
85 N. L. R. B. 131 (1949),

dealing with the question of what the Board considers

to be a substantial proportion of employees transferred.
79 Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 55 N. L. R. B. 1183 (1944).
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long period of time to preclude the establishment of a single employer
unit and hence such an agreement will constitute a bar to a rival petition. 0 Moreover, a bargaining history of only ten months duration
during which period the employer re-affirmed his intention to bargain
on a monthly employer basis by signing an extension agreement, was
found sufficient to preclude a petition based on a single employer
unit." Finally, the timeliness of an employer's withdrawal from
multi-employer bargaining has an impact upon the Board's contract
bar policy. While the Board has held that an employer may pursue
an individual course of action with respect to his bargaining and thus
withdraw from an employer association in joint bargaining, the withdrawal must be timely in relation to the period when modifications or
termination of the agreement is permissible.8 2
In summary, the conclusion appears inescapable that the framers
of the National Labor Relations Act as originally written as well as
the amendments added in 1947 purposely proposed that the Board be
given a considerable amount of latitude in dealing with issues involved in questions concerning representation. This was done in the
realization that the statute of this kind should not be static, but on
the other hand should be flexible enough to enable the Board to revise
or adjust its policies as the occasion required, taking into consideration not only the changed nature of our industrial society and the collective bargaining developments which have taken place over the
course of the years, but the internal developments within the framework of labor organizations as well.
If the decisions of the Board reflect a tendency in recent years
to emphasize the element of stability in labor relations as against that
of freedom of choice of representation, this is in recognition of the
developing maturity in our labor relations, the ultimate goal of which
is undoubtedly the resolution of issues between the bargaining parties
with intrusion by governmental agencies restricted to a minimum.
Our society goes through a constant process of evolution. The
changes which take place are no more graphically illustrated than in
our industrial life, and our national labor policy under these circumstances cannot be static. For the practitioner or analyst in the labor
80 Taylor & Boggis Foundry Division, 98 N. L. R. B. 481 (1952).
81 Acryvin Corp., 107 N. L. R. B. 917 (1954).
82 Bunker Hill and Sullivan Mining Co., 89 N. L. R. B. 243 (1950); Purity Stores,
93 N. L. R. B. 199 (1951).
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relations field, precedent is a valuable tool and an excellent guidepost.
By the same token, today's developments in the field of industrial
technology, by whatever name they are called, together with the
changes being wrought in our industrial framework and the organized
labor movement, presents new and challenging problems. No one can
predict with reasonable certainty the outcome of specific developments
or recommend specific solutions to what are, as yet, hypothetical
problems. Hence, the doctrine of stare decisis, appealing as it is, has
in this sense, a limited value in the industrial relations field. Future
decisions of the Board will reflect what it considers to be the statutory
intent and the public interest to be in laying ground rules for resolving questions on contract bar in an industrial society as complex and
dynamic as that in which we live.

